(Steve Vladeck) It can be very difficult these days to follow all of the developments in the Guantanamo litigation, even for those of us who are fairly active in it. Thus, I thought I’d take a minute to blog about the Government’s very significant brief in response to the Petition for Rehearing En Banc in al-Bihani v. Obama, filed yesterday in the D.C. Circuit (and discussed by Lyle Denniston @ SCOTUSblog here). [Full disclosure: I co-authored an amicus brief in support of rehearing en banc.]
The Government’s brief is telling in two distinct respects. First, as Lyle notes, the Government all-but concedes the principal ground on which al-Bihani is seeking rehearing en banc — i.e., that the panel’s sweeping holding that detention authority under the September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) is not informed (or constrained) by the laws of war is thoroughly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hamdi (and, to a lesser extent, Hamdan).
But the second telling feature of the Government’s brief, which is perhaps even more significant, is its full-bore defense of the al-Bihanipanel’s procedural discussion (which held, in effect, that Guantanamo detainees are entitled to exceedingly few procedural protections in their habeas cases notwithstanding Boumediene). In particular, at page 13 of their brief (page 17 of the PDF), the Government notes that “The panel simply recognized – correctly – that the habeas review mandated by Boumediene need not match the procedures that apply to habeas challenges to criminal convictions.”
This statement is an entirely fair summary of what the al-Bihani majority actually held. But, like the panel opinion itself, it is an incredibly deceptive reading of Boumediene. Here’s the relevant passage from al-Bihani, with citations omitted (and emphasis added):
Habeas review for Guantanamo detainees need not match the procedures developed by Congress and the courts specifically for habeas challenges to criminal convictions. Boumediene’s holding explicitly stated that habeas procedures for detainees “need not resemble a criminal trial.” It instead invited ‘‘innovation’’ of habeas procedure by lower courts, granting leeway for ‘‘[c]ertain accommodations [to] be made to reduce the burden habeas corpus proceedings will place on the military.’’ Boumediene’s holding therefore places Al–Bihani’s procedural argument on shaky ground. The Suspension Clause protects only the fundamental character of habeas proceedings, and any argument equating that fundamental character with all the accoutrements of habeas for domestic criminal defendants is highly suspect.
Do you see the sleight-of-hand? In the quoted passage, Boumediene was referring to the procedural protections that attach to criminal trials themselves, not to “habeas challenges to criminal convictions.” Indeed, the procedural protections that attach to post-conviction proceedings (especially non-capital cases) pale in comparison to those that the Constitution and various statutes require in criminal trials, especially these days. So, the al-Bihani majority conflated criminal trials with criminal (post-conviction) habeas, suggesting that, because Boumediene held that Guantanamo habeas petitions need not have the protections attendant to criminal trials, they also need not have the (far lesser) protections attendant to post-conviction habeas petitions.